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1. Introduction
Inclusive education is a contested concept.  Some reserve it for the principle that 
mainstream schools should welcome and adapt themselves to all children without 
exception, irrespective of the nature or severity of their difficulties or disabilities. 
Others use it to refer to the principle that such schools should welcome and adapt 
themselves to all children as far as possible.  The second principle embraces the 
thought that mainstream schools are incompatible with an adequate education for 
some children; the first principle rejects this thought.
I shall call these principles universalist and moderate respectively, and 
describe their defendants as universal and moderate inclusionists.  Moderates see 
inclusive education as compatible with, and indeed as requiring, the existence of 
‘special schools’ for a small number of children.  Universalists tend to be antagonistic 
to such schools, seeing them as threatening the project of universal inclusion.  At the 
heart of this conflict of views is disagreement about what is ‘possible’.  The 
universalist says or implies that it is ‘possible’ to include everyone; the moderate 
denies this.  I shall call this the ‘possibility clause’.
It has been suggested that the dispute is a storm in a tea-cup.  It is about the 
placement of a tiny minority of children, and an onlooker might ask: why should it 
matter what kinds of schools they attend, so long as their basic educational needs are 
met?  This might be answered, initially, by pointing out that in a world of scarce 
resources, the meeting of educational needs raises tough questions about distributive 
justice.  Society cannot afford to give everyone what they want, and the ambition to 
give everyone what they need is scuppered by the considerable conceptual difficulty 
of identifying needs and comparing severity of need.  These abstract-sounding 
problems translate into daily nightmares for children, parents and teachers who live 
with the practical reality of what they see as educational misplacement.  The inclusion 
debate is hugely consequential for many individuals, even if they are a small 
proportion of those involved in education.  This is one reason why the disagreement 
between universalists and moderates is not a storm in a tea cup.  
But there is another reason. The inclusion debate is not only about the 
education of children; it is also, as I shall argue in this paper, about the nature of a 
decent society.  Decent societies, according to Avishai Margalit (1996), are ones 
“whose institutions do not humiliate people (p. 1).”  I intend to follow this definition, 
and will suggest that, to the extent that special schools or other institutions are both 
systematically humiliating and generally tolerated, the decency of the society to which 
they belong is impugned. ‘Humiliation’ is defined by Margalit as “any behaviour or 
condition that constitutes a sound reason for a person to consider his or her self-
respect injured (ibid, p. 2).”  He distinguishes between psychological or empirical 
ascriptions of humiliation (a person, or group, feels humiliated, as a matter of fact) 
and normative ascriptions of humiliation (a person, or group, has a sound reason to 
feel humiliated).
This distinction is of the first importance.  The claim under consideration is 
that special schools are inherently, or by their nature, humiliating or demeaning for 
the children who attend them.  They give children a ‘sound reason’ to consider their 
self-respect injured, even if they do not in fact feel this way.  The claim is not, I 
should add, typically expressed this way, but it is implied by statements like the 
following (Centre for Studies in Inclusive Education, 2004):
The discrimination inherent in segregated schooling offends the human dignity of the child…
Segregated schooling appeases the human tendency to negatively label and isolate those perceived as 
different.  It gives legal reinforcement and consolidation to a deeply embedded, self-fulfilling, social 
process of de-valuing and distancing others on the basis of appearance and ability in order to 
consolidate a sense of normality and status.
The CSIE argues that special schools should be phased out altogether.  The 
implication is that we should ignore the wealth of testimony from people who place 
great value on special schools: testimony from parents of children with disabilities, 
and also from many disabled people themselves.  Jim Sinclair, an autistic man, writes: 
I do not know of any advocate from within the disability community who believes that inclusion should 
not be an available option.  Disability advocates believe that disabled people should be able to go 
anywhere and do anything in mainstream society… However there are concerns within the disability 
community that inclusion is not always the best option for every person with every disability, and that 
involuntary inclusion is as problematic as involuntary segregation (Sinclair, 1998a).
Against such testimony, the CSIE suggests that, insofar as we retain and tolerate the 
institutions known as special schools, we are sustaining a practice that is 
fundamentally indecent.  Is this right?  Do special schools as such, simply because 
they are special schools, and not because (or insofar as) they are bad or unsuccessful 
special schools, give children a sound reason to consider their self-respect injured?  
Some will no doubt object that this question over-intellectualises the problem. 
It seeks for reasons for feelings, and as such flies in the face of an influential tradition 
that puts reasons (or justifications) in one category, and feelings (or emotions) in 
another.  This tradition, which is firmly rooted in contemporary culture, advocates a 
kind of unconditional respect for feelings whatever they may be, independently of 
questions of justification. Indeed, the idea of seeking to justify feelings is seen as 
issuing from a set of unpleasant attitudes that are censorious and ‘judgemental’.  
This approach is embodied in the modern ‘self-help’ movement, which seeks 
to boost the self-esteem of children independently of the bases or reasons that one 
might have for experiencing a sense of self-esteem.  I have written about this at length 
elsewhere (Cigman, 2004).  I want to illustrate the point about sounds reasons for 
humiliation by reference to the possible excesses of feminism.
Feminists, traditionally, are angry with men.  They feel humiliated by their 
treatment and status in male-dominated societies.  Under certain circumstances, these 
feelings (anger, humiliation) are not only feelings; they are reasonable responses to 
the situations in which women find themselves.  It is essential to emphasise this 
‘reasonableness’, which paves the way for a potent critique of the social conditions 
which oppress women.
However feelings of anger or humiliation can become inappropriate or 
excessive, depending on the adjustments that society makes or fails to make.  Without 
going into any detail (which might provoke unnecessary disagreement), feelings can 
outlive the rationale that initially inspired them.  This, I want to emphasise, is not a 
political but a conceptual point.  The point is that it is possible for feelings to be 
excessive or unreasonable insofar as they fail to respond to circumstantial change. 
This possibility lies at the heart of Margalit’s distinction between psychological and 
normative ascriptions of humiliation.  
The idea that special schools are inherently humiliating or demeaning is often 
(but by no means always) advanced by people who experienced the pain and 
humiliation of old-style segregated education.  There is no doubt that the legacy of 
such schools for many is an enduring sense of stigma and inferiority.  The principle of 
such schools, established by the 1944 Education Act, was that ‘abnormal’ or 
‘handicapped’ children would be sent to an institution which catered for one of eleven 
categories of handicap, irrespective of any other attributes that the child may have. 
Although some children fared reasonably within this system (on the liberal aspect of 
the 1944 Act see Dyson and Slee, 2001), many suffered intensely from the experience 
of being reduced to a category of handicap.  It should be clear a) that many children 
had sound reasons to feel humiliated and demeaned within this system, and b) that 
this is sufficient reason to abolish such institutions.  This, I believe, was recognised 
and addressed in the 1981 Education Act which followed the 1978 Warnock Report.
Universalists say or imply that special schools in the late 20th/early 21st century 
are in principle the same as post-1944 segregated schools.  They are inherently 
demeaning and should therefore be abolished, and the implication is that special 
school attendance can only be voluntary in the limited sense that it is chosen from 
options available within an indecent society.  It is chosen (and can only be chosen) 
insofar as mainstream schools do not provide a non-humiliating educational 
experience for some children; do not, in other words, adapt themselves adequately to 
those who fail to conform to a narrow stereotype of ‘normality’.
Associated with this claim is an argument about so-called labels: terms which 
refer to types or categories of difficulty or disability, like ‘autistic’, ‘deaf’, ‘learning 
difficulty’, and so on.  The suggestion is that such ‘labels’ are conceptually 
humiliating in the same sense as that in which special schools are institutionally 
humiliating.  (This is implied in the CSIE passage quoted above, where ‘labelling’ is 
associated with negativity, devaluation and distancing.)  Conceptual and institutional 
humiliation are analogous—they involve alleged injuries to self-respect—and also, of 
course, they are socially linked in the sense that ‘labels’ are associated with choice of 
special school, or within-school special provision.  My question about ‘labels’ 
parallels my question about special schools: do ‘labels’ as such constitute a sound 
reason to consider one’s self-respect injured?  As with special schools, some people 
with disabilities and difficulties accept and even value a ‘label’, claiming that it brings 
access to educational resources, greater understanding from others, and so on.  There 
is an autistic pride movement called Autscape, which considers itself radical rather 
than regressive, and argues that the condition known as autism is seen as 
embarrassing or shameful because it is misunderstood and misrepresented in society. 
‘Say it loud, autistic and proud’ is the label-affirming title of a newspaper article on 
this subject (Burne, 2005).  Jim Sinclair, quoted above, writes:
I am not a ‘person with autism’.  I am an autistic person… Saying ‘person with autism’ suggests that 
autism is something bad – so bad that it isn’t even consistent with being a person.  Nobody objects to 
using adjectives to refer to characteristics of a person that are considered positive or neutral (Sinclair 
1998b).
Are we to ignore this view?  Are we to accept the universalist idea that the ‘labelling’ 
of disabilities and difficulties is essentially negative or humiliating?  Len Barton 
(1993, p. 31) suggests as much when he assumes a continuity between special 
educational ‘labelling’ and the negative ‘labelling’ of children in the old secondary 
modern schools as ‘thick’, ‘stupid, ‘hopeless’.  Is ‘autistic’ like ‘thick’?  Does a child 
have a sound reason to feel humiliated solely because he or she is identified as 
autistic?  
It is crucial to raise these questions.  They involve a departure from purely 
empirical or psychological questions about whether people do feel humiliated by 
special school attendance or ‘labels’.  Empirically, one thing is certain; some do and 
some do not feel humiliated by these things.  It would be interesting to discover the 
true proportions of this difference amongst the so-called disabled population (and of 
course the boundaries of this group are ragged to say the least) as a whole. As far as I 
am aware, this empirical question has never been properly investigated.  Meanwhile 
universalists talk as if they represent all disabled people when they talk about the 
reduced self-respect and self-esteem suffered by children in special schools.  They 
support this assumption by retaining the expression ‘segregated schooling’ to 
emphasise the continuity between special schools as they are today and post-1944 
segregated schooling.  
Empirically they are wrong; they do not represent all disabled people, as the 
Autscape movement makes clear.  Disabled people speak with many voices, exactly 
as one would expect.   Indeed one could argue that the idea of a ‘disabled voice’—
which appears not infrequently in the literature—disrespectfully implies that 
independent thinking is alien to this group.  
However my present concern is not this.  I want to explore the philosophical or 
conceptual question of whether there are ‘sound reasons’ for a person to consider her 
self-respect injured by a) special school attendance or b) disability ‘labelling’, as 
such.  
2. Self-respect and the goals of inclusion
What counts as a sound reason to consider one’s self-respect injured?  I am suggesting 
that this abstract-sounding question has an urgent claim to our attention because it 
informs the puzzlement and unease that many people feel when they consider the 
universalist argument.  The universalist characterises special schools and ‘labels’ as 
inherently demeaning without clearly explaining why this must be so.  There is an 
empirical argument (some people feel demeaned by special schools/‘labels’), which 
(as I argued) disregards the multiple voices on this matter.  There is a rights argument 
(all children without exception have a right to a mainstream education: see UNESCO 
1994), which fails to identify a source for this right beyond the fact that it is claimed 
(see Cigman, 2007).  The rights argument sometimes sounds like a duty argument, 
suggesting that all parents have a duty to send their children to a mainstream school, 
irrespective of the nature or severity of the child’s difficulties or disabilities.  Another 
duty argument is sometimes ascribed to schools, which are said to have a duty to 
provide an appropriate educational environment for every child without exception.  In 
all this talk (or implied talk) of duties, there are suggestions about what ‘ought’ to be 
the case without any apparent awareness of the fact that, as philosophers put it, ‘ought 
implies can’.  (This principle is often attributed to Kant, though he did not say it in so 
many words.)    Schools ‘ought’ to provide a satisfactory environment for every child; 
but can they?  Is it possible to do what universalists say schools ought to do?  Many 
parents whose children have struggled in inclusively oriented mainstream schools 
seriously doubt that this is so. 
Many special school attendees are there voluntarily, and indeed many have 
struggled to gain resources to go there.  It would ordinarily make a crucial difference 
to the pride and self-respect of children whether they attend an institution because 
they have been denied access to another, or whether they have elected (indeed 
struggled) to go there.  Segregated schooling post-1944 involved the former; children 
with so-called handicaps were simply refused entry to mainstream schools.  Of course 
the same can be true today, and if so there may be a case to be answered.  However 
contemporary exclusions are generally couched (and by law must be couched) in 
terms of the practical difficulties of educating children with widely disparate needs 
and abilities together.  These alleged practical difficulties are typically viewed with 
scorn by universalists, or written off as due to under-funding or under-commitment to 
inclusion.  It is this that many find puzzling, not least because it appears to remove the 
need to investigate the practical issues empirically.  
To return to our question, what constitutes a sound reason for a person to 
consider her self-respect injured?  At this point, I shall offer only a summary answer, 
to be developed in the course of this paper.  The basic answer, I believe, was given by 
Kant, whose moral philosophy is considered by most philosophers today to articulate 
the foundation of modern liberal thinking.  Kant thought that the proper object of 
respect is the moral will, meaning the capacity possessed by all or most human beings 
to reflect rationally on what is right and wrong, distinguishing this from what one 
desires.  Irrespective of the kind of life a person leads, there is a presumption of 
capacity to reflect in such a way, which constitutes the foundation of our belief that 
every human being (with the obvious exception of those who are comatose and the 
like) is entitled to self-respect.  There is no space in this paper to expound this grand 
idea in any detail, but I would like to suggest that it relates to our topic in the 
following way.
First, Kant provides a basis for the notion of moral responsibility: the freedom 
to commit oneself to the values one passionately believes in and in particular to 
control one’s vital interests.  Of course this freedom is not unconditional.  It may be 
limited by available resources and by the requirements of distributive justice. 
Nonetheless, it is arguable that the closure of special schools would infringe upon this 
freedom in serious ways.  Many parents choose special schools because their children 
have been miserable and unable to learn in mainstream ones.  Such parents often 
deny, after bitter experience, that it is possible for mainstream schools to adapt 
satisfactorily to the needs of their child.  If respect is to be shown to parents who 
struggle for the retention of special schools, their capacity to reflect responsibly about 
the vital interests of their children must be taken seriously.
Second, Kant identified a kind of treatment of human beings which is not to be 
tolerated.  This is the treatment of a human being purely as a means to other people’s 
ends, as in slavery or the sexual abuse of women.  To treat a human being purely as a 
means to an end is to fail to respect him or her in the most fundamental way possible. 
Something like this is hinted at when universalists to talk as though all children are 
required to attend mainstream schools, irrespective of whether or not this serves their 
own interests.  The CSIE, for example, claims:
The existence of ‘special’ schools contributes to the insecurity and fear of rejection by those in the 
mainstream (undated).
No evidence is given of this.  Nor are we told whether special schools are supposed to 
contribute to the insecurity and fear of rejection of all, most or just a few. The failure 
to address this and other empirical questions contributes to the air of rhetoric which 
often surrounds the universalist position.  There is the worrying implication that 
parents have a duty to avoid sending their children to special schools in order to 
protect the feelings of children other than their own, and irrespective of the 
difficulties experienced by their own children in mainstream schools.  This suggests 
that parents of children who are already vulnerable in all sorts of ways have a duty, in 
Kantian terms, to treat their children as means to the ends of other children’s well-
being.
It is widely believed that Kant’s moral theory was not so much a model or 
conjecture as an articulation of the structure of our thinking about morality.  If this is 
right, it goes some way towards explaining why many feel uneasy about universalism. 
I have argued that universalism:
aspires towards a society in which all children attend mainstream schools, but it is based on an 
understanding of what special schools mean which is conspicuously unshared (Cigman 2007).  
In other words, universalists tend to disregard the fact that special schools are seen by 
many parents, not as inherently demeaning environments, but as liberating and in the 
best sense educational environments for their children.  Many parents fight for their 
children to attend special schools, and a parental attack on Tony Blair over the 
widespread closure of special schools in the UK was headline news just a few years 
ago.  No universalist can be unaware of this passionate clash of convictions, yet the 
universalist tendency is to portray special schools as inherently demeaning, as though 
there were no plausible view other than their own.  The goal of universal inclusion is 
pursued in a way that is pointedly (and, one might say, disrespectfully) oblivious of 
the non-universality of its own values.     
In short, a person has a sound reason to consider her self-respect injured if a) 
she is denied the freedom to pursue and control her vital interests, and/or b) she is 
treated as a means to other people’s ends. This, as I said, is a basic answer to the 
question about when humiliation is and is not a justified feeling.  We now need to 
consider and develop this answer in relation to inclusive education. 
3) Inclusion and the concept of possibility
As a theory about the educational practices that ought to be adopted, universalism 
flounders on the notion of possibility.  Ought implies can; it is either meaningless or 
unjust to say that someone (or an institution) ought to do something that in a real 
sense she (it) cannot do. Whether all children can satisfactorily be educated in the 
same classrooms and with the same curricula (which is what the inclusive philosophy 
is often said to amount to) depends in a serious way on empirical matters, about which 
I shall have more to say in due course. (It also depends in a serious way on the 
conceptual question of what counts as a ‘satisfactory education’; but I shall not 
discuss this here.)  But first I want to avert a possible misunderstanding arising out of 
my argument so far.  
I have suggested that universalism provokes unease by stating or implying a) 
that parents who believe passionately in special schools for their children should be 
rebutted or ignored, and b) that some children may be used as means to the end of 
other children’s well-being.  These two implications raise worrying questions about 
the extent to which the universalist agenda upholds the principle of respect.  Having 
said this, however, I think it is important to bring out the sense in which all 
inclusionists, universalist and moderate, are concerned about the principle of respect. 
I see the philosophy of inclusion, and the heated debate to which it has given rise, as a 
sustained attempt to resolve problematic questions about respect to which the recent 
history of educational segregation has given rise.
Who is different from whom?  To what extent should we conceptualise 
difference?  To what extent should we treat everyone as the same?  Is it demeaning to 
be identified as different from the norm?  If we retain the concept of normality, how 
should we define it and how should we think about people who fall outside its 
bounds?  If we reject the concept of normality, how can we ensure that atypical needs 
are adequately met?  How might we be failing those whose needs are atypical?  In 
particular—and I see this concern as pervasive and shared—how might we be failing 
to respect them?
The inclusion debate, according to the argument of this paper, is a kind of 
conversation in which these and similar questions are picked over.  The universalist 
exhibits what I call a homogenising tendency, meaning a reluctance to conceptualise 
individual differences and a desire to talk instead about human diversity as the 
condition of which we are all a part.  The moderate, on the other hand, exhibits a 
distinguishing tendency, which draws attention to individual differences (and 
particularly individual needs), in part as a corrective to the homogenising tendency of 
the universalist.  The homogenising and distinguishing tendencies gain their impetus, 
respectively, from the motives a) to ensure that everyone has access to common social 
goods and b) to protect individuals from neglect of their needs.  
Both these motives arise out of a concern with self-respect and the avoidance 
of humiliation.  Developing the Kantian account of respect, Margalit offers two 
interconnected concepts of humiliation.  The first:
I claim that humiliation is the rejection of a human being from the ‘Family of Man’…that is, treating 
humans as nonhuman, or relating to humans as if they were not human.  Treating persons as if they 
were not human is treating them as if they were objects or animals. (1994, p. 108)
And the second:
There seems to be a competing notion of humiliation to that of rejection from human society.  This is 
the notion of humiliation as the deliberate infliction of utter loss and control over one’s vital interests. 
(Ibid, p. 115)
It seems clear that the universalist preoccupation with inclusion expresses concern 
about humiliation in the first of Margalit’s senses: humiliation as rejection from the 
‘Family of Man’.  Schools are institutions which prepare children for adult life as a 
fully paid up member of society.  The testimony of many adults who were excluded 
from mainstream schools in the 1950s and 60s expresses the lasting pain and 
humiliation of being socially marginalised.  However my question remains: are 
special school attendees necessarily marginalised, and thus understandably 
humiliated, in a comparable way?  Or is the attempt to deny them access to such 
schools a way of humiliating them (denying them self-respect) by denying them 
control over their vital interests?
That universal respect is the fundamental issue that concerns all inclusionists 
is confirmed again and again in the literature.  Mel Ainscow, a well known 
universalist, writes: 
[Teachers must] …overcome the dangers and limitations of deficit thinking: only in this way can we be 
sure that pupils who experience difficulties in learning can be treated with respect and viewed as 
potentially active and capable learners. (Clark et al 1998, pp. 11 -12)
The reference to deficit thinking belongs to an argument about the use of ‘labels’ 
(‘labels’ fix a negative image on to children, and encourage people to see them as 
‘deficient’), with which some will disagree.  However, we see from this passage that 
there is a fundamental concern: all children without exception should be treated with 
respect.  People may disagree about what it means to show or withhold respect, but 
that all human beings are entitled to unconditional respect is, I suggest, the basic 
concern driving this debate.  
Universalists locate respect and disrespect primarily within institutions and 
concepts.  Moderates are concerned about forms of disrespect within inclusive (i.e. 
basically respectful) institutions, and identify this in part with the withholding of 
distinguishing concepts which give children access to the differential provision that 
they may urgently want and need.  ‘Exclusion within inclusion’ was a central concern 
of Mary Warnock in her 2005 paper, where she led the way for the moderates by 
arguing that many children with disabilities and difficulties suffer from feelings of 
exclusion within inclusive schools (Warnock 2005, p. 45; see also Rogers, 2007 and 
Pirrie and Head, 2007).  Such children are often bullied, teased or shunned.  They may 
have sensory or other difficulties which mean that they need an environment unlike 
that of a typical mainstream school.  (This seems to be true particularly of autistic 
children.)  Whereas in primary schools these sorts of difficulties are often easily 
overcome—primary school children are usually amenable to new ways of thinking 
about difference, and may be easily encouraged to put aside initial prejudices—in 
secondary schools life can be extremely hard for children who do not conform to 
standards set by their peers.  It seems that as children grow older, differences become 
more consequential, and the pain of a child who is stubbornly perceived as different 
may be irresolvable, except by removal to another school.
  Although Warnock does not articulate as I have the principle of respect for all 
children, it seems to me that her concern about ‘exclusion within inclusion’ is 
fundamentally this.  To say ‘this child is thoroughly miserable and failing to learn’ 
without even considering the possibility that the child needs a different kind of school 
is, she implies, disrespectful.  It is humiliating to feel excluded by other children at the 
school one attends, and this resembles the way it is humiliating to be excluded from 
the school one wants to attend.  
The universalist is unmoved by these sorts of considerations, and it is an 
interesting question why this is so.  I have suggested that institutional and conceptual 
respect are the universalist’s first concerns, and that these are bound up with the idea 
of a decent society.  But can a society be decent if it tolerates exclusion within 
institutions?  Is Warnock right to suggest (as I think she implies) that such exclusion 
is humiliating and hence an injury to one’s self-respect?  It is in response to this kind 
of question that the possibility clause is required: even if some children feel excluded 
within inclusive institutions, it is possible that they should become included.  It is 
possible, that is, that they will come to enjoy the goods of mainstream education: the 
sense of belonging to a community, the right to participate in shared programmes of 
learning, the opportunity to prepare for adult life in an inclusive society, and so on.   
The possibility clause is essential, for without it there is an unavoidable sense 
that the suffering of some children is shamefully ignored.  The universalist does not 
think he ignores this.  He sees suffering as an inevitable but provisional corollary of 
the ‘process of inclusion’, as Mike Oliver explains when he says that inclusion “is not 
a thing that can be delivered by politicians, policy-makers or educators, but a process 
of struggle that has to be joined (1996, p. 90).”  ‘Process of struggle’ implies that 
some failure is inevitable; the answer is not to duck it but to engage with it.  This is 
not a matter of keeping children in mainstream schools knowing that it is impossible 
that they should ever benefit; it is a matter, on the contrary, of believing that they can 
benefit, and trying to ensure that they do so.  
This is seductive thinking.  It suggests that even to ask whether the suffering 
of a child might be unacceptable is to fall into the trap of assuming that inclusion is a 
‘thing that can be delivered’, and hence assessable as a ‘bad thing’.  It gags parents 
who have a sense that their children are needed for the project of inclusion, whether or 
not their children need inclusive schools.  Conceptually, this way of thinking relies on 
a notion of possibility which is tenuous and weak.  What do we mean when we insist 
that something is possible?  Usually we mean that there are empirical grounds for 
feeling confident that a certain thing might happen.  When I set off on my hill walk, I 
was sure that a full day’s walking was impossible, given the recent injury to my foot. 
It is now 4 pm and, given that my foot is holding up well, I now believe it is possible 
for me to finish the course.  This, I suggest, is an everyday use of the word ‘possible’, 
and it is empirically based.
The universalist has no empirical basis for the possibility clause.  He does not 
say: we used to have doubts, but inclusive practice has improved so much that 
children we used to be concerned about are now learning happily alongside everyone 
else.  Rather, the possibility of including everyone is asserted or assumed, and in this 
sense it is essentially an article of faith.  It is asserted, moreover, in the face of a great 
deal of evidence to the contrary, showing that some children not only are unhappy in 
mainstream schools, but seem destined to remain so given our growing understanding 
of the nature of their difficulties.  (See, for example, Sainsbury, 2000, and Rogers, 
2007a.)  The moderate rejection of the possibility clause is based on precisely this 
kind of evidence; but the universalist is, as I said, curiously unmoved.
The assertion that it is possible to include every child in the mainstream 
appeals to a notion of possibility which is rather like a double negative: it is not 
impossible.  We think in this way when we say, for example, that it is possible that 
two adults produced by sperm from the same donor might one day meet and fall in 
love.  We are not willing to deny that this is possible; but statistically (given 
safeguards) it is almost vanishingly improbable.  The universalist’s possibility clause 
is not statistical; as I said, it is more like an article of faith.  As such it is unable to 
support a sincere belief in the possibility of including all children without provoking 
profound, and understandable, doubts.  
The refusal to deny that all children can be included is maintained in the face 
of considerable empirical evidence.  I have mentioned autistic children, and the 
literature on children with social and emotional difficulties supports the idea that 
mainstream schools can be disastrous not only for their teachers and classmates, but 
for these children themselves (see Rogers 2007b).  It is hardly surprising that this is so 
when one thinks about the meaning of mainstream education as a creative community 
of children embodying shared values and a shared approach to learning.  Some 
children have difficulties which are inescapably social in nature; they appear unable to 
understand the nature of groups or to participate in such communities (see Moore 
2007).  The idea that they can learn to participate—that such learning is ‘possible’ 
(see Cigman, 2001)—may be optimistic without being remotely realistic.  
It is hardly surprising that the universalist drains the notion of possibility of 
empirical or factual content, given her uneasy relationship (as I shall argue) with 
human, everyday reality.  The reserve about the conceptualisation of difference, 
though intended to yield a richer perception of the reality of diversity, in fact creates a 
fatal barrier against proper receptivity to, and respect for, individual children.  This 
will be the theme of the next section, where I shall explore the theoretical 
underpinning of the universalist position.  
4. Inclusive education and the concept of reality
The universalist sees special schools as inherently demeaning, meaning that even if a 
child does not actually feel demeaned in a special school, she has reason to do so. 
This point is emphasised using terms like ‘exclusion’ and ‘segregation’ to refer to 
special school practice.  Children at special schools are excluded, are segregated, 
even if they have elected to attend these schools and are confident and learning well.  
This view has a theoretical or metaphysical underpinning, which is to say that 
it will be found compelling or not depending on whether one is prepared to accept a 
highly abstract argument.  Many do accept this argument, and I would add sceptically 
that many accept it hook, line and sinker, meaning that they are insufficiently critical 
and accept something they do not properly understand.  Indeed I would go so far as to 
say that it is not possible properly to understand this argument in the way that it is 
typically presented.
This is a large subject, for I am talking about the need to have a meta-
discussion about the sociological assumptions at the heart of much special education. 
In the space available, I can do no more than touch on this subject, and no doubt my 
comments will be found inadequate by many.  
The universalist position is said to be supported theoretically by a paradigm 
that is known as post-positivist.  The post-positivist paradigm negates the positivist 
paradigm which says:
1. Differences between learners are “objectively ‘real’”.
2. These differences “take the form of deficits and difficulties” which may be 
understood through medicine and educational psychology.
3. Special education is essentially a “rational response to these difficulties and 
deficits” (Clark et al, p. 158).
This paradigm will be recognised as that which informed post-1944 segregated 
education.  Some people were seen as normal; others had deficits and difficulties 
(‘handicaps’).  Such deficits and difficulties were seen as objectively ‘real’ and 
susceptible to medical and/or psychological interventions.  The aim of special 
education was to respond rationally to them, which meant giving priority to medical 
and/or psychological issues.
Post-1944 segregated education was unsatisfactory in ways that are familiar. 
Most unsatisfactory was the fact that many children were systematically humiliated by 
being reduced to a category of handicap.  We have discussed how they were excluded 
from the ‘Family of Man’, i.e. socially marginalised, in ways that were unjust and 
unacceptable.   
However positivism was not, according to proponents of post-positivism, 
confined to the post-1944 era.  The 1981 Act, which followed the 1978 Warnock 
Report and brought large numbers of children with (what were now called) special 
needs into mainstream schools, was said to perpetuate positivist ideas about 
differences between children.  It retained the idea that there are ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ children.  It tried to address the needs of the latter group through medical 
and psychological interventions.  It retained the idea that schools are primarily for 
‘normal’ children, bringing in others almost as an afterthought and insofar as they did 
not interfere with the education of the ‘normal’ ones.  Theoretically or 
metaphysically, it is argued, the post-Warnock educational era retained the three 
positivist assumptions listed above. 
The shift from positivism to post-positivism in the 1990s was accompanied by 
the conceptual shift from thinking in terms of integration to thinking in terms of 
inclusion.  To integrate children (as Warnock proposed) is to bring together children 
whose difference in kind is not in question.  (Differences between learners are 
assumed to be objectively ‘real’.)  To include children in single institutions is to give 
up the idea that there are differences of kind independently of socially constructed 
differences.  It is to make the concept of diversity more fundamental than the concept 
of difference, and this is expressed by saying that differences between learners are 
‘objectively unreal’. 
The post-positivist paradigm negates the positivist paradigm as black negates 
white.  At the heart of this paradigm shift is a pair of abstract claims:
• Differences between learners are objectively ‘real’. 
• Differences between learners are objectively ‘unreal’. 
On the face of it, these express two different beliefs or opinions that a person may 
hold.  ‘Do I believe that differences between learners are objectively real or unreal?’ 
sounds like a question that any intelligent person may ask herself and, after some 
reflection, answer. We could then line up the adherents of one claim opposite the 
adherents of the other, extracting from each a substantial position.  However this is 
precisely what we cannot do.  Because it is so unclear what the assertion and denial 
really mean or amount to, the opportunities for serious dialogue or debate between 
adherents of each are sadly lacking.  There is, in other words, an impoverishment of 
meaning which makes the debate between universal and moderate inclusionists 
polarised, repetitive and barren.  I now need to substantiate this claim.   
The philosopher Wittgenstein wrote:
Must I know when I understand a word?  Don’t I also sometimes imagine myself to understand a 
word… and then realise I did not understand it?
Wittgenstein wrote memorably that languages ‘idles’ when it is not connected to the 
machinery, as it were, of our everyday lives.  To understand a word is to understand 
the difference it makes, the work it does, the role it plays in particular situations.  If 
we deny that something is objectively ‘real’, are we saying that it is fake?  Are we 
warning people not to pay too much money for it?  If we can’t answer this question, 
or identify some other practical difference between believing and disbelieving 
something, then we may not have a clue what we are talking about.  
What does it mean to deny that differences between learners are ‘real’?  We 
should note, first, that the word ‘real’ rarely appears in this discussion without 
protective punctuation.  It is not an everyday word, or at least not as it appears in this 
context, and this should arouse some suspicion.  The philosopher J. L. Austin wrote:
‘Real’ is an absolutely normal word, with nothing new-fangled or technical or highly specialised about 
it (1962, p. 62).
Austin was warning people about the dangers of what one might call airy-fairy 
thinking: thinking that relies on language that ‘idles’, in Wittgenstein’s sense, because 
it is disconnected from everyday life.  Austin and Wittgenstein were profoundly 
sceptical about metaphysics—they thought that much if not all of it was literally 
meaningless—and in this they may have gone too far.  But they were right, in my 
view, to point out that the meaning of a term like ‘real’ is at the very least hard to pin 
down.  To earn its keep, as it were, metaphysics requires difficult, sustained 
reflection.  Inverted commas around words that give off a metaphysical smell are no 
substitute for thinking.       
We need to ask what difference it makes whether one asserts or denies that 
differences between learners are objectively ‘real’.  The answer is surely this: it makes 
an ethical difference and has nothing whatsoever to do with metaphysics.  We have 
touched on the ethical difference.  We have seen that people deny that differences 
between learners are real because they want to protect some children from the stigma 
of abnormality.  The problem, however, is that this suggests that other people do not 
want to protect children from the stigma of abnormality.  This suggestion is 
provocative and, I believe, in most cases untrue.  I have argued that all inclusionists 
are motivated by a desire to protect children from disrespectful practices and attitudes.
The appeal to metaphysics to support an ethical argument is misguided and 
also damaging.  There is a logical difference between metaphysics and ethics, which I 
should like to express as follows.  Metaphysics tolerates and sustains either-or 
thinking, whereas ethics is often corrupted by such thinking.  Assuming for a moment 
that we understand the claim that differences between learners are objectively ‘real’, it 
then makes sense to offer people a choice: do you believe or disbelieve this?  It is 
reasonable to suppose that a choice must be made, as a dealer in coins must decide 
whether a coin is genuine or counterfeit.  The idea of paradigms reinforces this idea. 
You are either a positivist or a post-positivist.  You cannot be both.  
Nothing could be less true when we turn to ethics.  The art of thinking well 
ethically, if I may put it like this, is precisely to avoid creating false and unnecessary 
disjunctions by thinking through the options imaginatively.  Yes, children should be 
protected from the stigma of abnormality.  No, children’s needs should not be 
neglected.  If children have needs which have traditionally earned them the stigma of 
abnormality, then we must acknowledge and try to meet these needs and also, as far  
as possible, protect them from the stigma of abnormality.  The idea that we either  
protect them from stigma or address their needs properly is a huge assumption.    
It is also dangerous because it sets up false polarities, creating an atmosphere 
in which productive dialogue and debate are impossible.  Imaginative solutions which 
synthesise apparent alternatives are discouraged.  The metaphysical denial that 
differences are real slides into an ethical denial that your difficulties are real, 
provoking responses like the following: 
…there is a tendency within the social model of disability to deny the experience of our own bodies, 
insisting that physical differences and restrictions are entirely socially created.  While environmental 
barriers and social attitudes are a crucial part of our experience to disability—and do indeed disable us
—to suggest that this is all there is to it is to deny the personal experience of physical or intellectual 
restrictions…  (quoted Oliver, 1998)
This is a disabled person asserting: the restrictions of my body are real.  One can 
understand why someone might be tempted to say this, and why the parents of 
children with disabilities are often desperately frustrated because their voices are not 
heard.  The post-positivist paradigm denies such parents a voice by interpreting their 
appeals as an expression of erroneous and outdated metaphysics.  This leads to the 
extreme polarisation that we see in special education today, and the result, as Brahm 
Norwich has rightly said, is a policy impasse.  
My concern about the role of the concept of reality in special education is 
captured in this passage by Iris Murdoch:
There is a two-way movement in philosophy, a movement towards the building of elaborate theories, 
and a move back again towards the consideration of some simple and obvious facts.  McTaggart says 
that time is unreal, Moore replies that he has just had his breakfast.  Both of these aspects of philosophy 
are necessary to it.  (1970, p. 1)
I am concerned that special educators have become so bewitched by their theories and 
so intent on their theory-building that they forget (to turn Moore’s remark around) that 
some children have not yet had their breakfast.  By this I mean that what is forgotten 
is that some children are losing out on an education.  
This impression is confirmed if we look at a rather confusing editorial chapter 
in a book about special educational theory.  Theorising Special Education (Clark, 
Dyson and Millward eds, 1998) grew out of a concern that “the state of theorising in 
special education was complex, not to say confused.”  What follows is a commentary 
on this theorising which is as confusing as the theorising itself.  Theorists, it is said, 
work in an “intellectual ghetto” involved in endless re-cycling of attacks on the 
positivist paradigm.  There is “internal fragmentation” in which commentators “divide 
themselves into camps engaged as much in critiquing each other’s work as in 
developing provision for vulnerable children.”  All this sounds like philosophers who 
are bewitched by the idea that Time is unreal.  We are told that such theorists are “not 
likely to be predominantly interested in empirical enquiry or in questions that demand 
empirical answers”; on the contrary, “set positions are rehearsed with no very clear 
means whereby founding assumptions can be problematised or changed.”  
From these remarks, it sounds as though theorising in special education is in a 
bad way indeed.  Vulnerable children and their needs or pains or difficulties are 
apparently no longer on the agenda.  These are empirical matters, in which special 
educators of this ilk are ‘not predominantly interested’.   Instead, they are interested in 
‘set positions’ which are immune to criticism or enquiry.  
It is puzzling, having read this, to come across the sentence: “None of this 
constitutes a criticism of work undertaken within this paradigm.”  In this sentence 
(and elsewhere) the editors distance themselves from their unease with the state of 
theorising which the book sets out to address.  I see this as a serious and unresolved 
equivocation.  I would argue that it permeates not only this book, but the entire debate 
as it is conducted from a universalist or post-positivist perspective.   
5. Conclusion
I want to conclude with a few remarks about the ethical importance of the concept of 
reality in discussions about special education.  I begin by quoting two universalists 
whose theoretical position is that all differences between people are socially 
constructed.  The first, Mike Oliver, writes:
The reality is, of course, that disabled people’s lives cannot be divided up in this way to suit 
professional activity…(Oliver, 1996, my emphasis)
This appears in the course of an argument to the effect that many disabled people’s 
lives have been taken over by professionals and pseudo-professionals. The second 
passage is this, by Derrick Armstrong:
The rhetorical emphasis upon mainstream schools as the point of delivery for educational support 
[under New Labour] was hardly new.  Given the continuing reliance upon special schools for the most 
disabled and troublesome pupils the reality did not represent such a radical departure from the past as it 
was claimed to be (2005, p. 3, my emphasis).  
Both Oliver and Armstrong use the term ‘reality’ (without inverted commas) in the 
course of an argument to the effect that something of importance has been 
overlooked.  Both are committed to the proposition that there is no such thing as 
‘reality’ beyond our social constructions.  My purpose here is not to make a cheap 
point.  It is to argue that the denigration of reality which permeates universalism is not 
only pseudo-metaphysical but unsustainable.  Reality is not a super-realm to which 
our statements correspond or fail to correspond.  Reality is what we point to when we 
are engaged in a debate with someone who, we feel, fails to see things clearly.  We 
draw attention to reality in the course of an argument.  We talk about reality when we 
try to be truthful or get something right.  The concept of reality serves a purpose when 
we try to engage with each other and with the circumstances or situations in which we 
find ourselves.  Raimond Gaita expresses this well: 
Ethical understanding is often coming to see sense where we had not seen it before, or coming to see 
depth where we had not seen it before.  It is seldom learning something completely new (there are no 
Nobel-prize winning discoveries in ethics) and it is seldom seeing that there is, after all, a valid 
argument to support positions we had previously judged to be dubious.  It is often seeing what someone 
has made of something that we had often heard before. (2004, p. 281)
The term ‘reality’ is not used in this passage, but it seems to me that it is implied.  The 
concept of reality plays a crucial role in enlightened and, I would say, respectful 
dialogue.  We use the word ‘reality’ quite literally in the hope of enlightening people, 
bringing them to share our view.  The use of this word, far from expressing a 
dogmatic or deluded notion of absolute truth, may carry a supposition that the other 
person is willing to respect one’s view, take it seriously, consider re-thinking her 
position.  The freedom to say ‘the reality is this, not that’, as Oliver and Armstrong do 
unwittingly, is essential for fruitful dialogue.  It takes us beyond the stilted, 
consensual thinking that plagues so much sociology, in which motives and 
assumptions are ascribed to large numbers of people as though there is no possibility 
of variation.  
It is essential that special educators hear individual voices, and attend to the 
realities to which they draw attention.  There are many disabled voices, not just one, 
and many attitudes towards disabled people, not merely a prevailing attitude which 
issues from an abstraction called society.  The term ‘reality’ plays a crucial role in a 
respectful dialogue between individuals, and this is what special education frequently 
lacks.  Indeed one could say that what is needed is a truly inclusive dialogue, in which 
differences between disputants are heard and treated with respect.  There is something 
deeply paradoxical about a debate which aims to secure respect for all children, 
conducted (as I believe it often is) without respect.  
In this paper I have called for a substantial improvement in the quality of 
special educational debate.  There is a backlash against inclusion—not against its 
fundamental values, but against its insistence on unconditional universality.  This 
needs to be taken seriously, for nothing less is at stake than the decent, i.e. non-
humiliating, treatment of some children.  Children who cannot flourish in inclusive 
mainstream schools are no doubt a small minority; but their existence has been 
highlighted in all sorts of ways in the last few years, and it needs to be acknowledged 
by all participants in the debate.  The following is no doubt true:  
…we should focus individualised special needs strategies only on the very small minority of children  
who genuinely need provision that is ‘additional to or different from’ what an enhanced mainstream 
can provide on a group basis (Dyson and Slee, 2001). 
I have argued that failure to address the needs of a ‘very small minority’ means failure 
to accord respect to all, in favour of the contested and puzzling value of inclusion for 
all.  
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